10. Political liberalism and the preventive containment of unreasonable beliefs and behavior
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.20919/sspt.25.2015.34Abstract
This paper examines the ways in which illiberal and unreasonable views can be legitimately contained in a politically liberal society, and discusses some of the pressing reasons to undertake, or abstain from, such measures. Theoretical background for the discussion is provided by Rawlsian political liberalism. The paper focuses on the particular justification for the preventive containment of unreasonable views offered by Jonathan Quong (2011). It is claimed that Quong’s approach raises some significant worries (not unrelated to the ‘third-order pathologies’ discussed above in Chapter 2). The suggestion is put forward that political liberals would do well to pay more attention to respect and relations of recognition.References
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