The University of Sussex Undergraduate History Journal

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"The 20th Century"

Edited by George Bodie, Chess Dennis,
Elizabeth Hardwell and Julia Kompe.

Contents

Welcome...

..to the first issue of the University of Sussex Undergraduate History Journal. We aim to showcase the very best of the creative and vibrant history written by Sussex students across multidisciplinary subjects, and in doing so hope to inspire both debate and reflection. This journal gives students a chance to receive recognition for the hard work that goes into writing their essays, and we are proud to be able to release them into the academic world. In turn, the journal allows wider academia an insight into the fresh and innovative ideas blossoming from undergraduate talent. We have been overwhelmed by the positive response from students and university staff and hope to establish the journal as both an integral part of undergraduate life at Sussex and a valuable mediator between students and established researchers.

The University of Sussex is renowned for its flair in modern and contemporary history, and we wanted to celebrate this in our first issue. The articles we have selected focus on 20th century history and a range of themes which are relevant to our lives today, and are written by first, second and final year students. We have also endeavoured to showcase essays which shed fresh light on old debates and challenge the way we think about history.

Doing both is **Matt Blisset**, who uses Tolstoy's theory of structure and agency as a starting point for a sensitive interrogation of the depth and uses of historical study. By using the development of the European Union as a case study, Blissett articulates opposing methods of examining past, and argues for a deeper connection with historical truth in this thought-provoking and perceptive article.

James Adams' essay on Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* breathes fresh life into a well-established debate by examining the reasons for the book's popularity in West Germany. Adams contextualises its reception within the realms of Holocaust memory and national identity by using contemporary sources and in doing so connects with the complexities of a modern German society still negotiating its relationship to the Second World War.

Also taking a new stance is **Adam Tolcher**, who explores issues of race and class in the South African Rand Rebellion of 1922. Demonstrating a sound awareness of current historiographical trends, Tolcher argues that the economic circumstances of white miners resulted in their enthusiasm for a 'colour-bar' for socio-economic reasons rather than those derived solely from racial discrimination.

Sam Walton casts an analytical eye over Cold War historiography, and endeavours to challenge the harmony of post-revisionism by exposing its nuances with particular reference to the work of John Lewis Gaddis. Walton argues that post-revisionists are far from reaching a truly discerning analysis of the aggressors of the Cold War and urges for a reconsideration of established arguments in order to gain a more accurate insight into the conflict.

Last but not least we have **David Hutt**, who has created an innovative analysis of the similarities between the British National Party and the National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nazi Party) in

an article which is truly relevant to modern times. By using Ernst Nolte's analysis of fascist ideology, Hutt argues convincingly that 'anti-transcendence' is central to the nationalism of both parties and in their views of respective 'others.'

We really hope you enjoy the first edition, which is a testament to the hard work and commitment of the editing team and, of course, the talented students whose work we have selected. Any comments on the journal or any of the articles will be gratefully received; please email them to us at usuhj@sussex.ac.uk.

Best Wishes,

George Bodie, Francesca Dennis, Elizabeth Hardwell, and Julia Kompe.
The USUHJ Editing Team.

Assess the effect of structures and of human agency in the making of history, in reference to one of the first two thematic strands from the History of Now.

Matthew Blissett

BA History, University of Sussex (Brighton, UK)

Abstract: This article aims to make sense of and find some form of resolution to the tension between agency and structure in our accounts of the past. Using examples from the development of the European Union through the lens of Tolstoy's theory of history, it is argued that while the philosophical arguments between structuralist historians and those who favour agency are unlikely to be resolved, it is possible to sidestep the issue somewhat by determining *why* we study history at all. A deeper, more intuitive *feeling* for the truth of history, honed by negotiating the dynamic tension between agency and structure allows us to acknowledge and develop our subjective experience and mastery of our own agency and the structures which shape those experiences in the present moment. By doing this, we free ourselves from those structures and allow a greater creativity in our lives.

Keywords: agency; structure; European Union; Tolstoy; purpose of history

What is history for? This is a crucial question to hold in our minds as we attempt to tackle the question of the role of agency and structure in history. We can take it as a given that accuracy is an unqualified duty of historians, but to what end?[1] This is a question I shall return to, as I believe that it contains a possible solution to the seeming opposition of structural and agent-based approaches to history.

Explanations of historical events that emphasise human agency seem to satisfy our intuitive feeling for our own free will—we want to believe that it is in our power to choose our actions on our own terms. Thus from these individual actions, structures must emerge to coordinate, reflect and express the aims of their members.[2] Fast-forward this process over time and you find a modern world such as ours with a vast and chaotic network of inter-relating institutions, lifestyles and cultures.

Structural explanations look for deeper patterns than the confluence of individual actions, positing that the institutions we are part of, the circumstances into which we are born, have a much greater effect on us than we have on them—we are shaped by our

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[1] Carr, E. H., *What is History?*, (London: Penguin, 1990), p.10

[2] Pistor, Marcus "Agency, structure and European integration" in *The Political Economy of European Integration*, ed. Erik Jones & Amy Verdun (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p.110

surroundings, the choices we make are both limited and influenced by them—the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.[3]

Now as historians, we find ourselves with a further problem when attempting to look back at the past. On the one hand, history depends on evidence, on facts—it is self-evident that we *must* say what actually happened. On the other hand, we need to analyze, to find ways to interpret and make sense of the evidence that we find or we will consign ourselves to meaninglessly reporting census statistics and diary entries.[4] There is a clear tension between the drive to report the many events and people which make up history and the need to crystallize or interpret those observations into something that we can make sense of.

In his essay on Tolstoy's philosophy of history "The Hedgehog and the Fox," Isaiah Berlin quotes the Greek poet Archilochus: "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing."[5] Berlin uses this image to articulate this crucial philosophical difference between those who see history through the lens of monist, rational theories (hedgehogs) and those who emphasise the pluralism of empirical observations (foxes)—hedgehogs favour deterministic, structural explanations of events, foxes see history as the contingent, random convergence of human agency.

The Fox

One of the ways foxes look at history is through the stories of "Great Men"—kings and tyrants marching their armies across Europe, waging war and forming back-room allegiances with one another. Historians of this ilk argue that those at the top of society are more powerful and therefore *more free* than the masses underneath and that their decisions are what drives history. Therefore historians ought to concentrate on these great men in order to understand the causes of world history.[6] While this may initially sound like a rather old-fashioned approach, when we apply this argument to the history of the European Union we can actually see strong evidence to support this view.

Far from being a populist movement, from its very beginnings the project of European integration has been a product of the maneuverings of the European political élite, exercising its considerable powers of agency over its citizenry.[7] The circumstances surrounding Britain's attempts to join the EEC during the 1960s provide support this view—in 1963 and again in 1967, French president Charles de Gaulle repeatedly vetoed Britain's applications due to his personal distaste for the English. However after he had resigned in 1969, Britain applied to join again and was accepted.[8] This personal disinclination of de Gaulle didn't only affect the fate of the British people in the 1960s, Denmark and Ireland also missed out as their applications were joined to the UK's. Without speculating over counterfactuals, it is clear that at the very least the economic and political history of these

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[3] Pistor, Ibid., pp.110-111

[4] Carr, Ibid., p.11

[5] Berlin, Isaiah, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An essay on Tolstoy's view of history,* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953), p.1

[6] Evans, Richard, *In Defence of History,* (London: Granta, 2000), p.162

[7] McCormick, John, *Understanding the European Union,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.119

[8] McCormick, Ibid., p.54

three countries would have run significantly differently had Charles de Gaulle not held such anglophobic views.

From another angle, we can see the fox's worldview coming through quite strongly in the postmodern construction of history. Postmodernists are far more democratic in their prejudices, seeking to tell the forgotten stories of those at the periphery of society. Richard Evans argues that while postmodernism also has a tendency to "[elevate] impersonal discourses to the centre of historical analysis," [9] its central project of presenting the world as a confluence of competing narratives means that it gives greater preference to the voices of those disenfranchised from the mainstream than more traditional approaches do. This new focus on the history of the excluded allows such individuals to speak for themselves, highlighting their value as historical agents, even if they do not appear to have contributed anything of wide significance.[10]

Arguably one of the greatest and most popular achievements of the European Union has been its promotion of social equality and human rights. Here we can see evidence of the political success of the postmodern, pluralistic approach to history—while these changes were again led from the top, it is clear that such legislative protections by definition seek to bring minorities into the fold, allowing them to participate on an equal footing in the creation of new history, regardless of the structures into which they might be born.[11] However this is perhaps a rather generous view of the motives of the EU in promoting such rights, as few stand to gain more from a prosperous and contented Europe than its political and financial leaders.

The Hedgehog

Structural accounts of history attempt to see through empirical data to the hidden natural laws that guide the course of events. They claim that our agency is largely illusory or that it is at least subject to the structures into which we are born—as Marx asserted, "[People] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but in circumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from the past."[12] So on the level of the individual, our agency is formed by our context, orthodox Marxists would claim by our economic *class*. Individuals, even those at the top of society, are merely representatives of their class and its economic interests—a *purely* structuralist viewpoint would claim that it is irrelevant to study the actions of individuals as anything other than class representatives and that much more insight can be gained by investigating the economic and class structures themselves than the individuals that inhabit them.

Fitting in with Berlin's analysis, we see that structuralists assume that there are laws of historical progress, which it is our jobs as historians to investigate. When we try to model history, to interpret facts and place them in an over-arching narrative, it is almost inevitable that we generalize, that we *make* them relevant by their relationship to structure.[13] Since empirically speaking, all we have available are individual facts, any observations of

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[9] Evans, Ibid., p.189

[10] Parke, Catherine N., *Biography: Writing Lives*, (London: Routledge, 2002), p.97

[11] McCormick, Ibid., pp.179-181

[12] Marx, Karl in Pistor, Ibid., p.110

[13] Carr, Ibid., p.12

structures are interpretive, analytical and ultimately subjective. Caesar did cross the Rubicon, but it is up to us to determine what that meant.[14]

What structures can we see at work in the history of the EU? Marxists claim that the EU was born out of an economic need to challenge the hegemony of the USA and USSR in the post-war years. Marxist historian Peter Cocks writes, "Regional integration was a mechanism for accommodating and reinforcing the expansion of European capital while simultaneously protecting it from the possibly excessive rigors of international competition... The necessity of generating support for new integrational institutions, and thus legitimating the power that flows from them, is at the bottom of integration ideology."[15] So the bourgeois capitalist élites driving European integration have done so precisely because it suits their economic interests, and the ideology of human rights and equality that supposedly underpins the EU is little more than a salve—ideological bread and circuses to mollify the masses.

Reconciliation?

Is there any way to reconcile these two views? Of course, all historians have to use both agency and structure to talk about the past, but this fact does not help us bridge the *philosophical* gap. Tolstoy performed mental gymnastics in his attempts to make sense of the Napoleonic Wars. By inclination a fox, Tolstoy nevertheless believed that there must be something that lay behind the surface of history[16], that it was folly to imagine that Napoleon was able single-handedly to persuade hundreds of thousands of men to cross Europe and invade Russia. Rather he claimed that the French must have been driven by a hidden force, that required a figure to lead them eastwards but Napoleon's choices while in that role were limited.[17] Tolstoy had little time for notions of battle strategy, depicting scenes of battle in War and Peace that make it impossible to believe that the orders of generals and emperors could have any effect at all on what took place. Tolstoy claimed that there were such an infinite number of potential factors and circumstances in any event that one could scarcely believe in human agency at all.[18]

However in his depiction of his characters, Tolstoy displays a clear interest and belief in the existential and phenomenological state of humanity, that our private worlds are dominated by our choices.[19] Yet he was seemingly unaware of this contradiction in his thinking and offered no positive theory of how we might come to know *anything* about the structures that lay behind history, he simply felt that they must be there.[20]

Conclusion

And so we come to our original question - what is history for? Because it is here that I believe we find a solution to Tolstoy's crisis. If our aim is to know the perfect truth, to

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[14] Carr, Ibid., p.11

[15] Cocks, Peter, "Towards a Marxist Theory of European Integration" in *International Organisation*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 1980), p.39

[16] Berlin, Ibid., p.75

[17] Berlin, Ibid., pp.21-23

[18] Berlin, Ibid., pp.74-75

[19] Berlin, Ibid., p.39

[20] Berlin, Ibid., p.36

penetrate the visible world and see through to the mechanisms underneath, then we are better off giving up history and becoming mystics or philosophers or physics students—history will not solve such problems of epistemology or ontology. However Herbert Butterfield elucidates on the possibility of a more appropriate use for history:

> *"[If through the accumulation of wide and reliable information, a historian can gain] an **insight** into the deep causes of things, the hidden sources of the changes that take place… then such a person would be able to acquire the right **feeling** for the texture of events, and would undoubtedly avoid becoming the mere slave of the past. I think he would be better able to face a new world, and to meet the surprises of unpredictable change with greater flexibility."*[21] [my emphases]

So it is not the content of history itself that is important, but the capacity to use it to *intuit* our responses to the present. As Butterfield states, "History is more useful when transmuted into a deeper wisdom that melts into the rest of experience and is incorporated in the fabric of the mind itself."[22]

So perhaps studying history is the method by which we ensure our freedom and capacity for agency in the face of Marx's "circumstances transmitted from the past". If we are aware of the structures acting upon us, we can choose whether or not we live by them or choose a different path. The "great men" we observe in history—Caesar, Napoleon, Gandhi, Mary Wollstonecraft—are those who were aware of their place but chose to occupy another. Through this lens, we can see the project of history as a constant renegotiation of the interstices between analysis and evidence, as new themes and events become more or less significant. By staying flexible and constantly *unlearning* history, we develop better ways of acting in the present.

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[21] Butterfield, Herbert, *History and Human Relations*, (London: Collins, 1951), p.181
[22] Butterfield, Ibid., p.173

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Why was Daniel Goldhagen's Book *Hitler's Willing Executioners* so popular in Germany?

James Adams

Contemporary History BA, University of Sussex (Brighton, UK)

Abstract: Daniel Goldhagen's book 'Hitler's Willing Executioners' sold extremely well in Germany after its publication in 1996 despite the book concluding that the Germans were predisposed to commit the Holocaust based on a uniquely German eliminationist anti-semitism. This article addresses the reasons for the book's popularity in Germany. In particular it highlights the importance of historical memory on national identity, politics and society. It shows how the reaction to Goldhagen's book reflected many of the issues that concerned contemporary Germans.

Keywords: Daniel Goldhagen; Hitler's Willing Executioners; reception in Germany; Holocaust memory; national identity

Few Historical works have achieved greater success and have aroused more heated debate than Daniel Goldhagen's book *Hitler's Willing Executioners*. Goldhagen's theses rests on the assertion that since the medieval period a specific form of eliminationist anti-Semitism had developed in Germany. For Goldhagen the German population were predisposed to eliminating the Jews, and that when Hitler came to Power in 1933 rather than tentatively leading the Germans to commit mass murder he effectively opened the floodgates. Goldhagen also greatly expanded the number of perpetrators, suggesting that hundreds of thousands were involved and that millions more would have willingly participated given the opportunity.[1] Despite the harsh rejection of the book by many German and non-German historians the German version of the book, published in August 1996, sold incredibly well. Eighty thousand copies of the German edition sold in the first month of the books release and by Goldhagen's tour in September three thousand copies a day were flying off the shelf.[2] The Goldhagen controversy shows the importance of the public discourse on historical memory in effecting national identity, politics and society. It is these issues that this investigation will address. It is worth noting that it was predominantly west Germans who engaged in such a strong way with the book and that the book was received differently in the former east. Although interesting this is not the focus of my research and any references to 'Germans' below will predominantly relate to 'west' Germans. This research has drawn on secondary sources, such as *Facing the Nazi Past* by Bill Niven and *Unwilling Germans?* edited by Robert Shandley, and articles published during the debate by Goldhagen and German historians, commentators and journalists. These actors in the debate were key in formulating the public discourse on Holocaust memory. An analysis of these sources will

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[1] Goldhagen D., *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, (London, 2001), pp.3 - 25

[2] Grossmann A., 'The "Goldhagen effect": Memory, Repetition, and Responsibility in the New Germany' in Eley G. (ed.), *The "Goldhagen Effect" History, Memory, Nazism – Facing the German Past*, (Michigan, 2000), p.113

establish the reasons why Goldhagen's book was so popular in Germany and its effect on Holocaust Memory. This essay identifies several key areas of the book's appeal in Germany. Firstly the context in which it was produced and the previous public discussions of the Holocaust. Secondly the effect of reunification on Holocaust memory, the need to readdress the Holocaust and to confront issues of German nationalism. Thirdly it will analyse the role of Holocaust memory in Germany's geopolitical situation, German national identity and on the notion of German collective guilt. Fourthly the appeal of the book itself, its arguments and their implications. Finally the essay will analyse the role of the media and the marketing campaign in the book's commercial success. Through addressing these themes the essay will provide a number of interlinking explanations for the book's success in Germany.

The history of the Federal Republic is strewn with what Anita Grossmann has termed 'Holocaust moments', these Holocaust moments represent attempts within Germany to normalize or confront their past by remembering, commemorating and working through the questions of guilt and responsibility.[3] Some of these holocaust moments include the stage version of *The Diary of Anne Frank* in 1956, the discussions prompted by the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961, the nationwide screening of the television series *Holocaust* in 1979, the *Historikerstreit* in 1986 and finally events in the 1990s such as the film *Schindler's List* and the *Crimes of the Wehrmacht Exhibition*. In many ways the Goldhagen controversy is just one more episode of Holocaust confrontation that every German generation seemingly must pass through as a quasi rite of passage.[4] Germany's debates regarding the Holocaust are not solely formed within its boarders, the influence of Americans and in particular American Jews in forming Holocaust memory in Germany is significant. The stage production of *The Diary of Anne Frank*, *Holocaust* TV series, *Schindler's List* and Goldhagen's book are all American imports and this is an important subtext in German Holocaust memory. The frequency of these so called 'Holocaust moments', whether created internally or externally, indicate how *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with the past) has earned the Federal Republic political legitimacy and has become a crucial and intrinsic part of German, specifically West German, civic identity since 1945. Heinrich August Winkler diagnosed this obsession with confronting the darkest period in German history as a form of 'negative nationalism'. Germans seem to possess a sense of pride in repenting and dealing with and their Nazi past.[5] In this respect it is not surprising that an American Jew's provocative book on Germany's Nazi era should have prompted such a huge response in Germany.

The reception of Goldhagen's theses can not be separated from the immediate context of historical debates in Germany at that time. As stated above the 1990s signified an explosion in *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in Germany, *Schindler's List*, the *Crimes of the Wehrmacht* exhibition and the success of *Victor Kemperer's Diary* all prompted significant Holocaust discussion in Germany shortly before Goldhagen's book burst onto the scene. The themes that emerge in these representations of the Nazi era are very much connected to those within Goldhagen's work. *The Crimes of the Wehrmacht* exhibition was hugely controversial. It shattered the myth of 'the honourable German army' as it documented at length the Wehrmacht's involvement in genocide.[6] This exhibition, like Goldhagen, greatly expanded the number of German perpetrators, which before had been confined to the Nazis and the SS. The combination of these two radically expanded assessments of the number of perpetrators had irrecoverably altered the collective memory of that period. The false image that World War Two and the Holocaust were events carried out by unidentifiable strangers in faraway places was shattered in the public imagination.[7]

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[3] Ibid*.*, pp.89 - 90
[4] Shandley R. *Unwilling Germans? – The Goldhagen Debate*, (Minnesota, 1998), p.28
[5] Grossmann, 'Memory, repetition and responsibility' in *Goldhagen Effect*, pp.91 - 123
[6] Hamburg Institute for Social research (ed.): *Crimes of the Wehrmacht. Dimensions of a War of Annihilation*
    (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2004), pp.3 - 33
[7] Shandley, *Unwilling Germans*, p.22.

Goldhagen is often regarded in connection with or even as a successor to *Schindler's List*. The film is concerned primarily with individual freedom and it tells the story of how one man's actions made a difference. Goldhagen's study on 'ordinary Germans' is also concerned with individual actions and responsibility, in their own ways both Goldhagen's book and the film have undermined the notion of a 'choiceless German' and both were immensely popular amongst younger Germans.[8] *The Klemperer Diary* offered an account of what German policies directed at Jews actually meant in everyday life. In this way Klemperer's diary and Goldhagen's study are both comparable and compatible. Although the comparisons can only go so far, Goldhagen's 'ordinary Germans' were always anti-Semitic, while Klemperer's account reveals the complexities of the Nazi society because he experienced both brutal anti-Semitism and acts of solidarity and kindness.[9] Goldhagen's book entered Germany at a time when the fear of confronting a study of the average German and the possibility of recognising him as one's own grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, aunt or uncle was replaced by the willingness to take the risk of such a recognition.[10] The reception of these other representations of the Holocaust showed that in the 1990s large numbers of Germans were prepared to question the complicity of the German population in the Holocaust. They were inclined to accept an enlargement in the numbers of those responsible, discredit the notion of a 'choiceless German' and understand the particulars of anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany. All of these issues Goldhagen tackles in his book and in a very direct way. In doing so he was providing the Germans with a history that they wanted to hear.

Why were the Germans of the 1990s so inclined to address the issues raised above? There is a generational element to the answer and a new generation of Germans increasingly detached from events in the Second World War were starting to confront issues of memory in a new way. But the answer lies mainly in discourses relating to the reunification of Germany. The reunification of Germany in 1990 marked an end point in German history, the Nazi legacy was finally overcome and the allies relinquished all sovereignty back to the Germans.[11] 1995 was a significant year for Holocaust memory in the newly reunified Germany, it was the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the War's end and for some the commemorative rituals in the new Germany represented the drawing of a line under the past. The enthusiastic reception of Goldhagen's book in Germany could represent the public's rejection of attempting to normalize or to move on from Germany's troubled past. This is definitely the interpretation of many historians and commentators in Germany and eventually they came to congratulate Goldhagen for restarting the Public Discussion about the Holocaust and its perpetrators.[12] The *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* also acknowledged the role Goldhagen played in restarting the public debate and in attempting to find an appropriate way for Germans to deal with the criminal period of their past. For this the *Blätter* awarded him the Deomcracy Prize.[13] Goldhagen's popularity in Germany can partly be attributed to his direct and forceful confrontation with the Holocaust and its origins, in doing this he drove the change in the collective memory of the Holocaust.

The Goldhagen debate also prompted many historians and commentators to assess the book's implication on German nationalism and the country's future. Hans-Ulrich Wehler understood the political impact of the book and suggested that the international response to Goldhagen's theses

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[8] Reemstma J.P. 'Turning Away From Denial: *Hitler's Willing Executioners* as a Counterforce to Historical Explanation' in Shandley (ed.) <u>Unwilling Germans? - The Goldhagen Debate</u>, p. 256 & Grossmann, 'Memory, repetition and responsibility' in <u>Goldhagen Effect,</u> p.108.

[9] Reemstma, 'Turning Away From Denial' in <u>Unwilling Germans?,</u> pp. 257 – 258 & Niven W, <u>Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich</u>, (Routledge, 2002), pp.138-139.

[10] Reemstma, 'Turning Away From Denial' in <u>Unwilling Germans?,</u> pp.257 – 258.

[11] Niven, <u>Facing Nazi Past,</u> p.1.

[12] Ibid. p. 120 & Herbert U, 'The Right Question', in Shandley (ed.) <u>Unwilling Germans?,</u> pp.109 – 117.

[13] Habermas J. 'Goldhagen and the Public Use of History: Why a Democracy Prize for Daniel Goldhagen?' in Shandley (ed.) <u>Unwilling Germans? - The Goldhagen Debate</u> (Minnesota, 1998), pp.263 – 275.

indicated that the Germans should be under no illusions that their past is still very much alive and capable of coming back to haunt them.[14] Frank Schirrmacher, co-editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, wrote in an early review that if Goldhagen's theses is to be believed then Germany's progress into the twenty-first century is to be regarded with fear and scepticism.[15] Volker Ullrich in an article in *Die Zeit* newspaper draws a comparison between Goldhagen's book and Fritz Fischer's work *Germany's Aims in World War One*, which introduced the concept of Germany's violent nationalism and the notion of the dangerous German national Sonderweg (special path). Ullrich suggested that through Goldhagen's connection between German nationalism and eliminationist anti-Semitism that he was reawakening the Sonderweg theory.[16] These arguments reflected more on the political discourses and concerns in Germany at the time, rather than the specifics of Goldhagen's argument. Goldhagen consistently stated that post-war Germany had drastically changed and that his theory was not in any way a comment on modern Germans.[17] Many critics also become fixated on the issue of collective guilt. Rather than seeing that Goldhagen was asserting collectivity in German actions critics immediately accused him of trying to introduce notions of collective guilt, when in reality guilt rarely appears in his work.[18] This indicates that memory of the Holocaust in Germany is also inextricably linked to the issue of guilt. The fact that the debate turned to these issues, despite of the book's content, reveals the power of these themes in contemporary German politics and culture. Many Germans would have engaged with Goldhagen's work to investigate the implications on German guilt and national character that his book presented. These statements reveal how contemporary Germans were nervous about the implications of Holocaust memory on the future of the newly reunited Germany. In this respect the debate on Goldhagen's theses takes on a geopolitical role and many Germans were quick to dismiss or discredit the potential implications within *Hitler's Willing Executioners* on modern Germany.

Goldhagen clearly felt the need to emphasise his position in the German edition of his book and devoted much of the foreword to distinguish present-day Germans from their Nazi counterparts.[19] In his reception speech of the *Blätter* Democracy Prize Goldhagen celebrated the fact that the Germans welcomed foreigners such as himself to write about the darkest moments in their History. He asserted that in embracing the views of outsiders German national history is highly self-critical and more accurate as a result. He suggested that because of this the Germans had learnt from their past in a way other countries had not. In his concluding statement Goldhagen said "it is really all the people in Germany, responsible for making the Federal Republic the democratic country that it has become, who deserve the prize."[20] Volker Ulrich had warned against "stylizing this event as a graduation test for our society."[21] But that is exactly what the Goldhagen debate became in Germany. Goldhagen managed to completely separate present-day Germans from their Nazi predecessors, although he did not attempt to suggest that anti-Semitism had completely disappeared from Germany. Goldhagen himself was stylizing his reception in Germany as a graduation test for Germany, he even went so far as to suggest that the German model for

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[14] Wehler H-U. 'Like a Thorn in the Flesh' in Shandley (ed.) *Unwilling Germans? - The Goldhagen Debate* (Minnesota, 1998), p.103 .

[15] Schirrmacher F. 'Hitler's Code: Holocaust from Faustian Aspirations' in Shandley (ed.) *Unwilling Germans? - The Goldhagen Debate* (Minnesota, 1998).

[16] Ullrich V. 'Familiar Tones' in Shandley (ed.) *Unwilling Germans? - The Goldhagen Debate* (Minnesota, 1998), pp.117 – 118.

[17] Goldhagen D. 'Failure of the critics' in Shandley (ed.) *Unwilling Germans? - The Goldhagen Debate* (Minnesota, 1998), p.143.

[18] Shandley, *Unwilling Germans*, p.12.

[19] Ibid., pp.17 – 18.

[20] Goldhagen D. 'Modell Bundesrepublik: National history, Democracy and Internationalization in Germany', in Shandley (ed.) *Unwilling Germans? - The Goldhagen Debate* (Minnesota, 1998), pp.275 – 285.

[21] Ullrich V. 'A Triumphal Procession: Goldhagen and the Germans', in Shandley (ed.), p.201.

confronting their nation's past should be internationalized.[22] Goldhagen not only flattered the German people but in making these statements as an American Jew and the Son of a Holocaust survivor he was in effect legitimising Germany's status as a nation. The political appeal of Goldhagen's message undoubtedly accounts for a large amount of his popularity.

It would be impossible to assess the success of *Hitler's Willing Executioners* without analysing how the book itself appealed to the audience. The simplicity of Goldhagen's theses made his work accessible to a large number of readers.[23] The simplistic explanation that the Germans were predisposed to genocide of the Jews and that the Nazis merely unlocked these murderous tendencies appealed to many readers as it made it the origins of the Holocaust easy to understand. As Ruth Bettina Birn argued, Goldhagen's book served those who wish a simplistic explanation to very complex events.[24] Goldhagen also stands by the forceful tone in which he wrote his book. In his introduction he states his reasons for writing in the active instead of the passive voice when describing the crimes were to restore the perpetrators to the centre of our understanding. He also does not shy away from using the term 'German' to describe those who took part in the genocide, he said that calling them 'Germans' was simply calling them by what they were. Goldhagen's descriptions of the crimes committed during the Holocaust are extremely vivid and shocking.[25] Wippermann wrote that Goldhagen does not "recoil from describing fictitious scenes as well as real ones in order to arouse the desired effect on the reader."[26] Hans Mommsen criticised Goldhagen for his narrative style commenting that the portrayal of "sadistic and gruesome violence releases a certain voyeuristic moment that serious holocaust research has deliberately avoided."[27] Norman Finkelstein is also critical and suggested that Goldhagen's work represents Holocaust Literature rather than Holocaust historical scholarship.[28] Whatever its value to historical method it is certain that it added to the appeal of the book. It made the book easy and stimulating to read but it also satisfied the morbid fascinations held by readers as it enabled them to experience the role of the perpetrator and to understand the extremely cruel nature of the Holocaust.

In asserting that the genocide came out of the heart of German society the book tackled a taboo which had developed in German society, that there was an unquestionable distinction between 'criminal Nazis' and 'ordinary Germans' and the book was popular as a result. Goldhagen's work also prompted the public to reconsider recent new right ideologues who tried to question Germany's war guilt or to emphasise good aspects of the Nazi regime.[29] A newspaper article in the *Tagezeitung* about Goldhagen's tour of Germany reveals what the average German reader wanted from the book. It reports that the audience wanted to understand what had brought normal people to murder men, women and children in cold blood and that whenever the discussion turned to this topic it would cause the greatest response. Interviews conducted after the event showed that many were troubled by the question of what they would have done in the some position, and that it was this issue that had stimulated their interest in the debate.[30] The book not only appealed to readers because of its simplistic explanation of events it also directly addressed the issues that the public demanded. It demonstrates that popular discourse of historical memory is very subjective and often reflects the desires of the population in the present rather than a desire for historical truth. As stated above

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[22] Niven, *Facing Nazi Past,* p.131.

[23] Reemstma, 'Turning Away From Denial' in *Unwilling Germans?,* p.257.

[24] Finkelstein N & Birn R, *A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen thesis and historical truth*, (Henry Holt, 1998), p.148

[25] For an example see Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, p.218.

[26] Wippermann W. 'The Jewish Hanging Judge? Goldhagen and the "Self-Confident Nation"' in Shandley (ed.) *Unwilling Germans? - The Goldhagen Debate* (Minnesota, 1998), p. 229.

[27] Mommsen H. 'The Thin Patina of Civilization: Anti-Semitism Was a Necessary, but by No Means a Sufficient Condition for the Holocaust' in Shandley (ed*.) Unwilling Germans?* (Minnesota, 1998), p. 195.

[28] Finkelstein, *Nation on trial,* pp. 88 – 90.

[29] Wippermann, 'Jewish Hanging Judge?' in *Unwilling Germans*?, p.257.

[30] Semler C. 'Ein Provokateur auf Tour' *die Tageszeitung 7/09/1996,* p.16-17.

Germans in the 1990s were predisposed to such a book because they wanted answers to a specific set of issues, such as German responsibility, nature of Nazi society and the actions of individuals.

Rarely has an historical analysis received such publicity as *Hitler's Willing Executioners*. The intensive marketing campaign by Goldhagen's publisher and the role of this publicity in raising interest can't be overlooked. Volker Ullrich's article in *Die Zeit* on 12th April 1996 titled *A Provocation to a new Historikerstreit* sparked the debate and by mid April every major newspaper in Germany had published a review.[31] The debate then slowly escalated with extensive coverage throughout the TV and media. This long drawn out process was essential to marketing the book as it continually broadened public awareness of the book. By the time the book was published in August the public discussion had been dragging on for a number of months. Goldhagen also refused to give any interview regarding the specifics of his book until he undertook a podium discussion tour of Germany and he urged the public to read his book before this tour so that they could judge the argument for themselves.[32] This was a clever marketing strategy, because he invited Germans to actively participate in the debate and also suggested that they had to read the book to understand the final outcome. The debate was also highly personalised, issues were raised about Goldhagen's upbringing and his relationship with his father who was a Holocaust survivor. The highly personalised nature of the debate can be seen in the podium discussion tour and the media unintentionally turned him into a martyr figure. The discussions seemed to take on the form of a tribunal where leading German historians did their utmost to discredit Goldhagen and the more he came under attack, the more the audience seemed to side with him.[33] Goldhagen's charisma also endeared him to the public and he did not embody the persona of the angry young man desperate to avenge his father that many in the German press had created for him. Goldhagen had a telegenic image, was passionate but respectful in defending his work and was very amiable in the public debates.[34] Volker Ullrich called Goldhagen's tour a 'triumphal procession', which would seem to be an accurate description of Goldhagen's reception in Germany.[35] Goldhagen's likeable image and the extensive marketing made a significant contribution to the commercial success of the book in Germany, but it would be wrong to attribute the success and impact of the book to commercialism alone.

This essay has demonstrated that there were many reasons why Daniel Goldhagen's book *Hitler's Willing Executioners* was so popular in Germany. The publication and subsequent controversy that surrounded the book must be seen in its wider context. The History of the Federal Republic is strewn with occasions when an event, publication or debate has prompted a public discussion on the Holocaust and its memory. The 1990s saw an increase in frequency of these 'Holocaust moments', the release of *Schindler's list*, the Wehrmacht Exhibition, Klemperer's Diary and Goldhagen's book all demonstrate similar trends in the public discourse and of Holocaust memory in Germany. Germans wanted to confront their past in a way that they had largely previously avoided but were now prepared to take the risk of recognising a family member as a perpetrator. In this respect Germans were prepared to accept an enlargement of the number of perpetrators, to discredit the notion of a 'choiceless German' and to understand the particulars of anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany. This change in the public discourse on the Holocaust can largely be attributed to the mood in Germany after the reunification. Tackling the nation's dark history forms a significant part of German national identity and any attempts, like those made in 1995, to normalize or move on from the past were

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[31] Shandley, *Unwilling Germans*, p.4.

[32] Schmitt V. 'Die deutschen als "willige Mörder"' *Associated Press Worldstream – German 4/08/1996*

[33] Niven, *Facing Nazi Past*, p.131 & Ullrich 'Triumphal Procession' in *Unwilling Germans?*, pp.197 – 202 & Deutsch, F., *The Holocaust, Historiography and the Media: an analysis of the Goldhagen Debate* (Sussex theses, 2002), p.22.

[34] Ullrich 'Triumphal Procession' in *Unwilling Germans?* pp.197 – 202 & 'Zeitgeschichte; Kein Deutschen' *Focus Magazin 22//07/1996* , pp.78 – 80.

[35] Ullrich 'Triumphal Procession' in *Unwilling Germans?* pp.197 – 201.

thoroughly rejected by the German population. Interest was undoubtedly raised by the accusations that his work implied a collective guilt for the German nation and by the geopolitical discussions taking place on the implications Goldhagen's book held for the future of the newly united Germany. The debate was framed as a graduation test for German society and Goldhagen fed this image, as an American Jew and son of concentration camp survivor he effectively gave the German state legitimacy through praising how Germany engaged with its past and how that strengthened the German democracy. The book itself appealed to the general public, its simplistic explanation for the holocaust allowed the average reader to understand the origins of the genocide. The narrative style and vivid descriptions made the book engaging, enabled the reader to experience the role of the perpetrator and satisfied any morbid fascinations with the Holocaust. The role of the media, the long build up of the debate and the marketing strategy of *Hitler's Willing Executioners* doubtlessly contributed to its commercial success. But good publicity alone is not sufficient to account for the book's success. In conclusion this essay suggests that the success of the book must be attributed to a combination of the factors listed above. Goldhagen and other events of Holocaust representation during the 1990s signified a major change in the public discourse of Holocaust memory, Germans were prepared to engage with the Holocaust in a much more open and self critical way. The success of the book is predominantly attributed to the issues it raised about German national identity and Germany's role within the world. The Goldhagen controversy clearly demonstrated the importance of Holocaust memory in German political and public discourses. The debate surrounding Goldhagen's book was not about representing the Holocaust in the most accurate way, but an expression of the fears, concerns and hopes of the newly reunited German nation.

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How does the 1922 Rand Rebellion reveal the relative importance of race and class in South Africa?

Adam Tolcher

History BA, University of Sussex (Brighton, UK)

Abstract: The violent uprising on the Witwatersrand in March 1922 has often been seen by historians as a test case for the Marxist interpretation of race and class in South Africa, led by authors including Frederick Johnstone. This article argues how white workers acted in order to maintain the 'job colour bar', which restricted black advancement in the employment hierarchy. Rather than a purely racist issue, the fact that blacks represented the majority of the population in South Africa at this time meant that they offered a convenient target for whites to exploit for their own economic benefit.

Keywords: South Africa, Rand Rebellion, racial conflict, capitalism, class, labour relations

The conflicts between race and class, culminating in the establishment of the apartheid regime in 1948, have been of great significance in South Africa throughout the twentieth century. Though whites represented the minority of the population, they maintained political control for almost fifty years through racial segregation. The Rand Rebellion of 1922, beginning as a strike but soon becoming a violent revolt, demonstrated the opposition of white workers to capitalism, and to the dissolving of the 'colour bar', which prevented black workers from gaining employment in areas of skilled labour and authority; jobs with higher wages, which were preferred by whites.

Capitalism forms a key part of the debate surrounding this subject, as historians argue whether the apartheid was brought about by capitalists for their own economic benefit, or as a result of the racist sentiments of Afrikaners and other social groups in South Africa. Merle Lipton is a key author in the debate surrounding this subject. Describing herself as a liberalist historian, she discusses the relationship between capitalists and apartheid, concluding that South African capitalists were relatively liberal in their views and their personal economic and class interests were more important than the apartheid policies. My examination of the Rand Rebellion will also explore the event in the context of the long term causes of apartheid, as in order to fully understand the issues of race and class in this period we must look further than just the months and years around the Rebellion; the origins of apartheid being closely related to those of the Rebellion. In analysing the origins of 1922, this essay will argue that class was more significant than race in South Africa at this time. Though racial issues certainly were important, the white mineworkers fought for the continuation of the colour bar in protection of their economic and hence class status, rather than against a fear of the elevation above them of those with a different colour skin.

The discovery of diamonds in 1864, and, more importantly, gold on the Witwatersrand in 1884, brought about significant economic changes to South Africa. As Bernard Magubane says, "the

gold industry gave a new complexion to almost every feature of South African life".[1] Until the Second World War, gold mining was the driving force behind the South African economy; the industry "stood at the centre of the structure and evolution of the modern South African social formation".[2] At the time, the Witwatersrand gold fields were the largest that had been discovered in South Africa. However, mining was highly expensive and difficult, as the ore was of a low grade, while its location was widespread deep underground, meaning that labour costs were also high. In response to these difficulties, the mining industry rapidly became centralised and capital was concentrated; by 1910 all mines had been brought under the control of six large groups of mining houses.[3]

The 1913 Native Lands Act disallowed Africans (with the exception of those in the Cape) from acquiring land outside specifically assigned 'native reserve' areas; such areas making up 7.3% of the land area of the country. The act also posed severe restrictions on the number of African families, known as 'squatter peasants', who were permitted to stay on farms owned by whites.[4] Furthermore, pass laws were introduced at this time, which controlled the movements of Africans and was aimed at keeping down their numbers. Such measures enlarged the supply and so reduced the cost of African labour, greatly benefitting landowners. In particular this helped white farmers, as the policies also reduced competition from black farmers.[5] However, more importantly, these measures provided the basis for an abundance of cheap, unskilled labourers who could easily be exploited by land owning whites to maximise their profits; the areas set aside for Africans by the Native Lands Act "became reservoirs of labor for the mines, towns, and white farms",[6] the significance of which will later be discussed. As they made up the majority of the population, blacks were also targeted by taxation, not only to raise revenue for the government but also to further increase pressures upon them to work for white masters. Such taxes were mainly either hut or poll taxes; taxes which could be imposed upon all the residents of a certain district, regardless of their income.[7]

The crisis leading to the Rand Rebellion began in 1921 with a sharp drop in the price of gold. Mine owners recognised that the most effective way to increase profits was to employ African workers at low rates of pay in place of more expensive white workers. The Transvaal Chamber of Mines, comprised of a group of mine owners, announced that the Status Quo Agreement was to be withdrawn, allowing an increase in the approved ratio of African to white workers. The Chamber argued that while wages for whites were rising, productivity was falling, blaming the white trade unions for "foisting unproductive whites in the industry" via the Agreement, which had frozen the ratio of African to white workers at 7.4 to 1, and other measures such as a reduction in black working hours by insisting upon their supervision by whites.[8] This led to, perhaps most importantly, the formation of the 'job colour bars', which were gradually introduced from the 1890s. The first formal ratification of the bar was in 1893, when the Volksraad adopted a regulation stating that underground blasts could only be carried out by qualified whites, while in from 1898 non-whites were no longer permitted to have a driver's certificate of competency.[9] The 1911 Mines and Works

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[1] Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane, *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa* (London: Monthly Review Press,1990), p.103.

[2] Frederick A. Johnstone, *Class, Race and Gold: A study of class relations and racial discrimination in South Africa* (London: Routledge, 1976), p.2.

[3] Rob Davies, Dan O'Meara, Sipho Dlamini, *The Struggle for South Africa* (London: Zed, 1988), p.8.

[4] Ibid., p.170.

[5] Merle Lipton, 'Capitalism & Apartheid' in John Lonsdale (ed.), *South Africa in Question* (London: James Curry, 1988), p.54.

[6] Magubane, *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa*, pp.81-82.

[7] Charles H. Feinstein, *An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination and Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.55.

[8] David Yudelman, *The Emergence of Modern South Africa: State, Capital, and the Incorporation of Organized Labor on the South African Gold Fields, 1902-1939* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), p.166

[9] Feinstein, *An Economic History of South Africa*, pp.74-75.

Act gave the bars statutory force, and they were extended and consolidated in the following years.[10] Though in basic definition the 'colour bar' may seem to have been an outcome of racial conflicts, assessment of its economic causes and development allows us to see that the reasons for its imposition were rather more complex. The bar came about due to pressures from white workers in order to protect their higher wages and position in the social structure. The bar restricted competition for skilled employment, hence raising the cost of skilled labour. Coloureds and Indians as well as Africans were excluded from these skilled jobs, which were reserved for whites. As there were many small firms in the agricultural sector and less successful unionisation of white workers than in the mines, farmers were able to evade the job colour bar, even despite high white unemployment in the period before the Second World War.[11] The mines however, as previously mentioned, were being run by a small number of large companies and as such could be regulated by the unions and government without such difficulties.

The job bar also influenced black access to training and education, but unlike in America in this period, this was not due to racism but in protection of the class system. Well trained and educated blacks could become elevated above whites in the class hierarchy, which would displace whites from their highly paid jobs, and threaten their high quality of life. The mine owners sought to reduce their costs and maximise profits, so as blacks represented an abundant, cheap workforce, it was in the interests of the mine owners to exploit them in this way. Krikler argues that, like white workers in the American South, South Africa's militant white workers may have been driven by the 'fear of competition' with cheaper black workers, but they were not long distracted by it. Class militancy trumped racial animosity and culminated in the violent strike against the state-supported mining industry. Krikler's conclusion that "black people were not identified as the enemy by plebeian white", points out that strikers and rebels in fact engaged in far more violence against white people than Africans during the conflict. Evidence suggests that the organised white labourers did not see the black mine workers on the Witwatersrand as their enemies. In reality, as the strike took place, whites opposed any repatriation of these migrant workers to their homes in the rural areas.[12]

Frederick Johnstone comments that racial discrimination provided an ideal way for capitalists to "ultra-minimise" their costs and therefore maximise profits; it therefore became a critical class interest of the mining industries secure a large supply of labour and therefore maintain its "ultra-cheapness".[13] Referring to what he calls 'class colour bars', Johnstone describes how the measures of racial discrimination served to secure class interests and to resolve class problems. These were the measures that through racial discrimination – "exploitation colour bars" –comprised the contract system, the pass system, the compound system and the wage minimisation system.[14] The white working class, in a social position of great insecurity, attempted to protect themselves against this insecurity.[15] White mine workers thus came to institute and operate a system of racial discrimination in the form of a job colour bar in skilled work. This specific involvement in racial discrimination is seen and explained (as with the involvement of mining companies with such discrimination) as a response to a specific class problem – the extreme structural insecurity of the white workers – and as a product of the specific system of production and class structure from which that class problem derived.[16] In particular, Afrikaners objected to competition with blacks not so much because they were black but because they were offering their labour at a cheaper rate than whites could socially afford.[17]

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[10] Davies et al, *The Struggle for South Africa*, p.6.
[11] Lipton, 'Capitalism & Apartheid', p.54.
[12] Jeremy Krikler, 'The Commandos: The Army of White Labour in South Africa' in *Past & Present*, No. 163 (May1999), p.208.
[13] Johnstone, *Class, race and gold*, p.26.
[14] Ibid., p.46.
[15] Ibid., p.64.
[16] Ibid, p.71.
[17] Hermann Giliomee, 'The Growth of Afrikaner Identity' in William Beinart and Saul Dubow, (eds.),

Technological advancement also contributed to the erosion of the job colour bar, as a less defined area of employment was created by mechanisation of the mining industry. These semi-skilled jobs were largely as machine operators; preventing a straight forward division between skilled and unskilled jobs, meaning that the job bar became more difficult to enforce.[18] As Lipton notes, "the policies of capitalists had dynamic consequences", as the erosion of the job colour bar "led to a variety of changes in education and training, wages, the stabilisation of labour and urban rights, job mobility and (eventually) trade union rights".[19] However, "the fact that mine owners were autocratic and liberal, disliked all trade unions, and supported racist measure forcing blacks to work for them, does not mean that they wanted the job colour bar".[20]

The Chamber of Mines in fact opposed the first statutory colour bar established in the Transvaal in 1893, arguing that a test for miners should be based on competence, not colour.[21] Furthermore, after the union of South Africa in 1910, the Chamber again opposed the legalisation of the bar in the 1911 Mines and Works Act, though the act was successful as it was backed by the combined power of the white unions and their Labour party. It is logical that white workers should support the establishment of a bar limiting competition for their jobs at a time of high unemployment, and as their main competitors were blacks; it is clearly understandable why whites would support the bar. The prestige accorded to occupations is an important element in this awareness of class distinctions, as Leo Kuper describes, observing how "it is often said that Africans, throughout the continent, have strong aspirations to white collar work, and that they attach high prestige to intellectual occupations, while despising the manual."[22]

The exploitation of black labour and this convenient racial discrimination can help us gain a greater understanding of the explanations for apartheid. Lipton outlines the two main schools of thought regarding the relationship between capitalism and apartheid. The first argues that apartheid was created by, and served the interests of, capitalists. The abundant supply of inexpensive labourers meant that the companies run by these capitalists profited greatly; a theory which says that it is proved by the success and rapid growth of the South African Economy. The alternative argument describes apartheid as the outcome of racist feelings, in particular amongst the politically dominant Afrikaner Nationalists.[23] Lipton's own argument incorporates features from both of the aforementioned points of view, saying that capitalists who relied upon an abundance of cheap labour were the chief supporters of apartheid.

In the aftermath of the Rebellion, there were successes for both the state and capital, as it rapidly became more evident that the National and Labour parties had been combined into the centre rather than estranged by the events of 1922; importantly, "the Rand Revolt showed it that a radical alliance of nationalist republicans and working-class revolutionaries was still possible".[24] In suppressing the strike, Smuts' government had alienated much of their support in working class districts. This led to the alliance between the parties, consolidated by the Nationalist-Labour Pact of 1923, as with the backing of white farmers and workers they became united against Smuts.[25] Meanwhile, the rapid growth of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) during the 1920s attracted the attention of the Communist Party, formed in 1921. Though the party had initially

Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa (London: Routledge, 1995), p.194.
[18]   Lipton, 'Capitalism & Apartheid', p.58.
[19]   Ibid., p.62
[20]   Merle Lipton, _Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986_ (Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1986), p.115.
[21]   Ibid., 110.
[22]   Leo Kuper, _An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class, and Politics in South Africa_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p.119.
[23]   Lipton, 'Capitalism & Apartheid', p.52.
[24]   Yudelman, _The Emergence of Modern South Africa_, p.185.
[25]   Al Stadler, _The Political Economy of Modern South Africa_ (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p.48.

concentrated on recruiting support among white workers, but after the Rand Rebellion turned its attention to Africans.[26] Class consciousness was far more important to politics at this time than race; white workers had been able to establish political power through the trade unions, as discussed earlier, which enabled them to protect their middle class position in South African society. The recently formed Communist Party targeted blacks for recruitment as they came to represent the majority of the working class, forced into a lower social standing by the government through a revitalised entrenchment of the job bar.

It is not only through political means that we can assess the concepts of class consciousness. Krikler highlights how "tracking women (and womanhood) through the documents also alerts the historian to the way in which the substitution of black for white workers in the mines was interpreted as threatening not just jobs, or rights within the workplace, but elements of the white worker's world far beyond these".[27] Krikler also notes the importance of the role of women during the rebellion to historians in helping us to understand the "enormous extent to which the revolt was the upsurge of a community rather than that merely of a male workforce".[28] Unlike many other rebellions in the past, the Rand Rebellion was more complex in its origins; the white workers fighting to protect their (and their families') place within the entire class structure, rather than simply to maintain wages or working hours. Intense class consciousness and anti-capitalism were integral to the white workers' conception of themselves and their place in the world.[29]

Although the explanations for the events of 1922 are found in class conflicts, there were also some racial issues, though between whites themselves rather than whites and blacks. Hermann Giliomee analyses the effects of the forces of industrialisation upon Afrikaners, who were increasingly being forced to move to the cities in South Africa; their urban population quadrupling from 1900 to 1926.[30] Those who moved to the city often suffered financially from the beginning of their migration, struggling to reach the economic level of skilled English speaking whites. Giliomee argues that the result of the Afrikaners' struggle in the economic field "would be decisive in determining whether they would see themselves primarily as an ethnic group or as a class", concluding that their group mentality was more racially than class based.[31] Although the actions of individuals such as Benjamin Farrington, who utilised the nationalism of Afrikaners in some cases to encourage them to support Sinn Fein,[32] Krikler reminds us that although the pride and consciousness of being an Afrikaner was important to many of the strikers, we should be careful not to give Afrikaner nationalism "a salience in the struggle of 1922 that it did not possess".[33] During the Rand Rebellion the symbolism of Afrikaner nationalism could "mingle rather easily with the other principle ideologies of the strike",[34] and so was less distinctive than one may initially have conceived.

The Rebellion took place due to the efforts of whites to protect their class status from those below them in the social hierarchy, in this case mainly blacks, from becoming elevated above them. Though certain racial issues were significant in this, these were largely between the white working classes and Afrikaners, as opposed to whites and blacks. While in America many whites believed blacks to be biologically inferior, and as such sought to keep them as the 'mudsill' of their society,

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[26] Ibid., p.145.
[27] Jeremy Krikler, 'Women, Violence and the Rand Revolt of 1922' in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 22: 3 (September 1996), p.350.
[28] Ibid., p.369.
[29] Krikler, Jeremy, *White Rising: the 1922 insurrection and racial killing in South Africa* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p.112.
[30] Giliomee, 'The Growth of Afrikaner Identity', p.191.
[31] Ibid., p.193.
[32] John Atkinson, 'Benjamin Farrington: Cape Town and the Shaping of a Public Intellectual' in *South African Historical Journal*, 62: 4, p.681.
[33] Krikler, Jeremy, *White Rising*, p. 107.
[34] Ibid., p.105.

blacks in South Africa at this time offered more of a convenient target for whites, as they represented the majority of the population and so could be economically exploited. The anger from the rebelling whites was not directed at blacks, but rather toward the threat to their already insecure position in society. As has been discussed, blacks were not the sole targets of the racial killings that took place, and the white workers did not class them as their enemies. The Rand Rebellion is a key event not only in comprehending social issues at the time, but also helps us toward an understanding of the beginning of apartheid. As Johnstone says, the Rand Rebellion was "the tip of the iceberg, merely one of many significant developments of class relations and class conflict within the white group and between whites and non-whites at that time".[35] One of the most significant economic and political events in South African history, "to this day, mass unrest and labour action in South Africa – actual or contemplated – are almost inevitably accompanied by media coverage explicitly suggesting an analogy with 1922. The Rand Revolt was the last sustained challenge from organized labour to the legitimacy of the South African state up until the present".[36]

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[35] Johnstone, *Class, race and gold*, p.3.
[36] Yudelman, *The Emergence of Modern South Africa*, p.164.

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Who was at fault for the Cold War?

Sam Walton

History and American Studies BA, University of Sussex (Brighton, UK)

Abstract: In this essay I seek to puncture the teleological view of Cold War history. In critiquing the current "victorious" version propagated by its chief proponent, John Lewis Gaddis, I hope to redeem a debate which Gaddis himself has declared is largely over. I utilise Gaddis' own systematic approach but argue that this reflects more unfavourably on the US, and favourably on the USSR, than he would like to admit. I contend that a new, genuine post-revisionism is needed that can cope with nuance and allocates blame fairly to both sides.

Keywords: Cold War; John Lewis Gaddis; post-revisionism; US; USSR; Cold War historiography

The happy, dialectal view of Cold War historiography tells the story of academics rejecting fallacious extremes and moving towards a more reasonable synthesis[1]. There are three main schools of thought on the explanation of the cold war[2]. The first is exemplified by George Kennan's Long Telegram[3]. The orthodox interpretation, favoured by the contemporary U.S administration, places the U.S on the moral high ground, simply reacting to Soviet aggression and expansionism. In the 1960s the revisionist school rose in response and instead blamed rampant American economic imperialism, which conflicted with reasonable Soviet security worries. Unimpressed by these simplistic, black and white interpretations a post revisionist school came to the fore. In this explanation both superpowers pushed their own agendas while misunderstanding and distrusting the others intentions. However, it seems to generally owe more to the traditionalist school; while regarding them both as blunderers the U.S was seen as the benevolent actor. In this essay I intend to evaluate the merits of the dominant brand of post-revisionism, which may be more accurately labelled the neo-orthodox. I will pay particular attention to the eminent John Lewis Gaddis who seems quite dominant in this area of scholarship.

In response to the ideology laced rhetoric of traditionalists some revisionists sought to excuse the Soviet Union as merely exhibiting the behaviour of a traditional great power. They were not forcing a dogma driven world revolution but simply practicing realpolitik. The

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[1] John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', _Diplomatic History_, Volume 7, Issue 3 (July., 1983)

[2] Timothy J. White, 'Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies', _International Social Science Review_, Volume 75, Numbers 3/4, (2000)

[3] George Kennan, The Long Telegram, February 22, 1946, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm, Date Accessed: 24/11/10

post-revisionists have found it relatively easy to adjust their critique of soviet expansionism as traditional grasping for power rather than an ideological war, although Gaddis argues for both[4]. However, they seek to bracket together Stalin's diplomacy with his peculiar domestic operation and thus attribute the Cold War to Stalin's paranoia and the very nature of authoritarianism. When Gaddis contends that 'Americans had begun to suspect... that the internal behaviour of states determined their external behaviour'[5] he is also indentifying the main thrust of his own argument. Indeed, Vojtech Mastny suggests that Stalin's actions were a logical extension of 'the Soviet system which had bred him... that system was the true cause of the Cold War'[6]. Moreover, they are subtly, perhaps insidiously, attempting to bring a moralistic tone back into the debate. Gaddis spends much of his first chapter characterising the two nations, contrasting autocratic tyranny with idealistic democracy. The U.S is then portrayed as carrying this idealism into international relations, a reluctant empire[7], their only crime not being harsh enough with the Soviets[8]. This narrative runs through their interpretation of the evidence but it does not bear close scrutiny.

Post revisionists disagree over whether Soviet expansionism was an extension of Stalin's personality or his necessary response to powerful forces within his government[9]. It seems clear that while Stalin's power did approach supremacy he was quite willing to use it to limit the expansionist tendencies of his more doctrinaire allies[10], in this case in Greece. This seems to indicate Stalin was seeking to adhere to the famous percentages plan as agreed with Churchill, which paints a far more reasonable picture of the man. Much of Gaddis' argument places far too much emphasis on Stalin's paranoia and mistrust. He contends that Stalin's espionage activities in relation to the Anglo-American bomb development project prove that he was a paranoid, unreliable ally[11]. The fact that two of three wartime allies failed to include the third in developing a revolutionary new weapon seems to escape his notice. Gaddis instead contends that the secrecy of the project was chiefly motivated by concerns over the Nazis[12], Stalin being kept in the dark apparently an oversight. Gar Alperovitz draws on numerous U.S government documents to highlight just how central the Soviet Union was to American policy concerning the bomb[13]. He reveals that major military authorities concluded that the bomb wasn't necessary to effect a Japanese surrender free of American casualties. These dissenters included Admiral Leahy[14], Supreme Commander Eisenhower[15] and the U.S Strategic Bombing Survey[16]. Moreover, the bombing survey concluded that Japanese surrender may even have been brought about without a Soviet invasion. The bomb was not just designed to limit the expansion of Soviet interests in

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[4] John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, , 1997), pp.13-14

[5] Ibid., p.35

[6] Vojtech Mastny, *'Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism', 1941-1945,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p.306

[7] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp.36-39

[8] Mastny, *Cold War*, pp.309-310

[9] Randall B Woods & Howard Jones, *Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for Order*, (University of Georgia Press, 1991), pp.13-14

[10] Ibid., pp.244-245

[11] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p.21; pp.92-96

[12] Ibid., p.93

[13] Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1995)

[14] Ibid., p.3

[15] Ibid., p.4

[16] Ibid., p.4

Asia but to alter the balance of power in Europe. Even Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, was concerned that the bomb was being used as stick to beat the Russians with[17]. This not only challenges the idea that the collapse of the wartime alliance was the Soviets fault but seriously undermines the picture of America as an innocent, principled nation.

Indeed, the evidence of the bomb highlights the usefulness of taking the Post-Revisionist paradigm to its logical conclusion. The idea of foreign policy as an expression of the system, the domestic machine, can be fully extended to the U.S. The simplistic idea that the democratic sentiments of America restricted or stifled imperial tendencies[18] seems to rest upon seeing the best in humanity, a naive stance. Woods and Jones suggest the end of mediation was triggered by the "Republican party's decision... to challenge the democrats openly on foreign policy issues"[19]. Truman then had to placate the increasingly powerful anti-soviet sentiment to maintain his political power. Daniel Yergin seems to contradict this interpretation of American policy by suggesting the American people were actually more isolationist than the political elite[20]. However, to gain the support for any coherent foreign policy diplomats like John Hickerson wanted a political speech to "electrify the *American people*"[21]. Sensationalist rhetoric resulted in a political and emotional response that quickly moved beyond the ability of more reasonable politicians to control. It seems that Stalin's power was able to absorb irrational pressures on foreign policy far more than a political class who depended on the whims of the populace for their careers.

In this post-revisionist narrative Stalin's unwillingness to co-operate in the new world order marks him at fault for the Cold War. The two superpowers were ideologically incompatible but it was the communists' uncompromising, ultimate aim of world revolution, their picture of all capitalists as exploitative enemies, that was the true problem. Gaddis argues that Wilson's vision of the post war world was one of multilateralism, of "collective security"[22]. It was Stalin who refused to embrace this principled vision, his unilateralism meant the U.S.S.R sought to 'maximise security for itself, while attempting to deny it to others'[23]. It was Stalin again channelling the violent, authoritarian system of Soviet governance that made any rapprochement impossible[24], the U.S was seeking to preserve its interests against aggressive Soviet expansionism. However, Melvyn Leffler suggests "The American Conception of National Security" was far more similar to the Soviet plan[25][26] than historians like Gaddis and Bruce Kuniholm like to admit[27][28]. When Leffler reasserts his

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[17] Ibid., p.429
[18] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp.13-16, 38-39
[19] Woods and Jones, *Dawning of the Cold War*, p.98
[20] Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978) p.282
[21] Ibid.
[22] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp.12-13
[23] Ibid., p.13
[24] Ibid., p.15
[25] Melvyn P. Leffler, The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48, *The American Historical Review*, Vol.89, No.2 (April., 1984, The University of Chicago Press), pp. 346-381
[26] Melvyn P. Leffler, 'Reply', *The American Historical Review*, Vol.89, No.2 (April., 1984, The University of Chicago Press), pp.391-400
[27] John Lewis Gaddis, 'Comments', *The American Historical Review*, Vol.89, No.2 (April., 1984, The University of Chicago Press), pp.382-385
[28] Bruce Kuniholm, 'Comments', *The American Historical Review*, Vol.89, No.2 (April., 1984, The University of Chicago Press), pp.385-390

argument that America planned for 'American hegemony over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans'[29] he suggests Gaddis has a limited understanding of the methods of control[30]. Gaddis' explanation of the American empire certainly seems limited[31]. He portrays it as more of a broad alliance based on political self determination and economic integration than any relationship based on dominance. Indeed, he makes the remarkable contention that America 'made no systematic effort to suppress Socialism within its sphere of influence'[32]. In fact as early as 1947 the Americans were willing to extend their commitments in Europe to do exactly this by taking over British responsibilities in Greece[33]. The broad system of military bases and the numerous regime changes effected by the U.S[34] certainly casts doubt on his idealised view of American foreign policy. Moreover, Leffler suggests the fact that American intervention in Greece, before the often cited Turkish and Iranian crises, is crucial[35]. It shows how America's expansion of its sphere of influence, its empire, was not a reaction to Soviet belligerence but a fear of sweeping radicalism across Europe. It responded to this independent socialist sentiment by using any means to crush the democratic far left. While the Soviet Union was certainly expansionist it was cautious, reactive and even Gaddis agrees that it certainly would have appeared to Stalin that America was remaking the world in its own image[36]. Misunderstanding and uncompromising visions of national security on *both* sides helped lead to the Cold War. However, America's view of any socialist activity as Soviet backed certainly helped ramp up the ideological polarisation of the conflict.

Stalin was certainly ruthless, autocratic and brutal; a paranoiac and murderous perpetrator of genocide. He was expansionist in the grand tradition of European great powers. However, these traits do not necessarily mean that he, or the Soviet Union, were at fault for the development of the Cold War. The U.S was far less principled and far more aggressive than Gaddis and his colleagues would like to portray. This does not mean an exoneration of the Soviet Union, a return to the problems of the Revisionist school. It instead demands a far more nuanced and balanced approach to the evidence that apportions blame appropriately to both sides. The breakdown of wartime relations was not due to Stalin's paranoia, he truly had reason to worry about the U.S led nuclear arms race. The very system of U.S government led to their foreign policy at the minimum matching the Soviet's level of aggressiveness. Moreover, ideological inflexibility on both sides helped lead to misunderstandings and regrettable responses. All this leads to the conclusion that the "Post-Revisionist Synthesis" [37], this growing consensus, is in urgent need of being reconsidered.

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[29] Leffler, The American Conception of National Security, p.349
[30] Leffler, 'Reply', p.393
[31] Gaddis, We Now Know, pp. 33-40; 43-46
[32] John Lewis Gaddis, The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis, p.174
[33] Robert Frazier, *Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War*, 1942-47 (Hong Kong:Macmillan, 1991)
[34] Michael Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008)
[35] Leffler, 'Reply', pp.394-396
[36] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p.36
[37] Gaddis, The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis"

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Is History Repeating Itself in the Growth of Nationalism and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the British National Party?

David Hutt

History BA, University of Sussex (Brighton, UK)

Abstract: By using Ernst Nolte's theory that 'anti-transcendence' is central to Fascist ideology, this article attempts to study the similarities between the National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nazi Party) and the British National Party concerning their beliefs about nationalism. It is argued that the principles of 'anti-transcendence' held by both parties have significantly affected their views about nationalism; determining their racialist concept of nationalism. By viewing 'others' (Jews, Slavs, immigrants, 'Islamists', etc) as being intrinsically 'transcendental' both parties come to the conclusions that deportation, expulsion and in the case of the Nazi Party; annihilation, is the only way to stop the changes in society from taking place and to return their nations to the parties' retrospective ideals.

Keywords: Nazi Party; British National Party; anti-transcendence; Fascism; far-Right; nationalism; anti-immigrant

Is the spectre of fascism on the rise again in Europe? Throughout Europe 'far-Right' parties are winning seats in their national bodies and in the European Union. France's 'Front National' was the forerunner to the new far-Right and one of the most successful by finishing second in the 2002 French Presidential elections. Most countries in Europe have since seen their respective far-Right parties expand in elections and society. Britain being no exception. The British National Party is progressively winning votes and respectability, possessing twenty-eight local government representatives and two seats in the European parliament. This rise is set against a backdrop of growing nationalism and racially motivated movements against immigrant communities. But is the modern day right-wing extremist in any way similar to the Fascist of the early twentieth-century; has society changed to such an extent that the modern far-Right have little in common with the 'classic' far-Right of the 1920s and 1930s? The purpose of this work is to evaluate whether certain aspects of the 'classic' Fascist regimes are repeating themselves in modern far-Right politics. The parties of focus will be the National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nazi Party) and the British National Party (BNP). Core to this will be the evaluation of the ideology behind nationalism; specifically the racial-nationalistic form of the Nazi Party, and whether there is repetition of this in the BNP. Secondly, are the causes of Nazi anti-Semitism repeating themselves in BNP's anti-immigration sentiment? It is important to note that throughout the work Nazism will be the pre-1933 form, as it is inadequate to compare one party in power with another that is not.

But what does fascism constitute? A clear definition is subjective due to the fact that fascism has no definitive ideology. Communism for example has irrefutable goals and beliefs; a communist in Cuba generally seeks the same ends as a communist in France. Fascism on the other hand may be better understood as possessing two different elements; the 'brain' and the 'heart'. In the 'brain', fascism is an anti-ideology with fascist parties united by what they are 'against' and not what they are 'for'. The historian Nolte[1], who although has been criticised for many of his controversial statements and leanings, gives a useful understanding to this anti-ideology. It operates in two different strata; politically where it manifests as anti-Marxist, anti-Liberal and anti-Capitalist; and sociologically where it is anti-bourgeois and anti-international. More important is fascism's 'heart', as more than other ideologies it is emotionally guided. As an anti-intellectual movement it is driven by strong reactionary emotionalism, which is why a lack of set goals is often beneficial as it can become highly malleable under different circumstances. For fascism this emotionalism often manifests with a romanticised vision of nationality; the greatness of the retrospect; the glory of old ways of life. Fascism is therefore often led by emotion-stirring leaders who use propaganda, parades, violence and fear to gain support and set beliefs. This very basic definition of fascism may be a useful for the 'classic' regimes but what significance does it have for the modern day far-Right. Perhaps one can say that the 'brain' of the modern far-Right is more developed. Sociologically the anti-bourgeois sentiment is downplayed and instead others groups are blamed for the social ills of unemployment, poor working conditions, poverty, etc. Also the modern far-Right is more concerned with appearing acceptable and not radical. However, it can be argued that the 'heart' of 'far-Right' is just as emotionally driven as it was for 'original' fascists. The BNP represents the anti-intellectual tradition that harks back to the greatness of the past whilst strongly opposing any form of change to an idealised vision of British society.

Although, as we have seen, fascism is complex; the fundamental element to it is nationalism. This structures the whole outlook as the nation becomes the 'myth' behind fascism, in a comparative way that 'class' is 'mythic' for Communists [2]. The Nazi's were great exponents of this national emblem, as the '*Volksgemeinschaft'* was a vision of citizens working for the purpose of an organic nation. However, the problem is that under fascism the terms 'nationality' and 'race' often become synonymous[3]. Historically this "*distorted equation of race with nation [was] solidly grounded in the European soil"* by the end of the nineteenth century[4]. This meant that in the pursuit of nationalism, fascism adopts a form of racialism. An individual's nationality is defined by his race and not by birth; thereby seeking nationalism ultimately means seeking racial purity. This can be clearly seen in the Nazi statement that "*only those who have German blood...can be our countrymen"*[5]. In the modern day, the BNP claims to be merely nationalistic and not racist, but a closer look reveals the same distortion of 'race' and 'nationality'. The BNP states that they; "*stand for the preservation of the national and ethnic character of the British people"*[6]. The BNP makes

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[1] Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Francaise, Italian fascism, National Socialism* (London: Weidenfeld, 1965)

[2] Peter Davies, *The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far-Right*, (London: Routledge, 2002), p.14

[3] Davies, *The Routledge Companion*, p.113

[4] Paul M. Hayes, *Fascism*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), p.23

[5] The NSDWP, *Program of the National Socialist German Workers' Party*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/nsdappro.asp (accessed 24th February 2010)

[6] The British National Party, *The Constitution of the British National Party (11th Ed.),* http://bnp.org.uk/resources/constitution-1th-edition (accessed 23rd March 2010)

this explicit that stating that nationality *"springs from blood and not from printers' ink"*[7]. So for both the BNP and the Nazi Party, the country of birth or citizenship had no relevance. A Jew whose ancestors had lived in Germanic areas for several generations would still not be considered German according to the Nazis. This is the same for the BNP who state that a person would not be British even if they were born in the country or a naturalised citizen if they are not racially Anglo-Saxon or Celtic. This consequates that 'nationalism' loses all its logical meaning of *"belonging to a particular nation"* and instead means belonging to a particular race[8].

As this race-nationalism is fundamental to fascism, it is only logical that those outside the 'race' are seen as *"threats"*[9]. One of the major aims of fascism is the defence of racial purity, which they propagate themselves not as aggressors but as defenders of indigenous population against an overwhelming racial enemy. The Nazis viewed primarily the Jewish and Slavic populations as *"the enemy and destroyer of the purity of blood, the conscious destroyer of our race"*[10]. For the BNP the rhetoric is no less subtle and shares the same intention. The BNP states that *"the real enemies of the British people are ...the Crescent Horde—the endless wave of Islamics who are flocking to our shores to bring our island nations into the embrace of their barbaric desert religion[11]"*. The way they will keep race pure is by racial separation. The BNP states that they are *"wholly opposed to any form of racial integration between British and non-[racially British] peoples[12]"*. An interesting similarity can be drawn from a comparison of the Nazi's and BNP's policies towards those who would continue live in the countries. The Nazi Party states that *"whoever has no citizenship is to be able to live in Germany only as a guest"*[13]. Almost identically the BNP states; *"those [non-British] who stay will be regarded as permanent guests"*[14]. Ultimately however, in order to create this racial separation, expulsion is the only method. The BNP advocates paid repatriation where they state generous financial incentives would be given for the emigration of those from the 'non-British' race; however one may speculate that this might take a more violent form if the BNP were ever to have the power to do so.

But why is the focus on 'race' so essential to both the Nazi Party and the BNP? Some of this can be placed down to simple racism; the belief that one race is superior to another can be found explicitly in Nazi sources and subtly in BNP sources. However for both the Nazi Party and BNP it is formed from an intrinsic part of their beliefs. When the BNP states that *"Britain's very existence today is threatened by immigration"* they do not refer to the actual country itself but to the way of life they want to preserve; the retrospective vision that the

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[7]   Nick Griffin, *The BNP: Anti-asylum protest, racist sect or power-winning movement?*
      http://web.archive.org/web/20071010043702/http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles/race_reality.htm
      (accessed   10th January 2010)

[8]   *Oxford English Dictionary Online*
      http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00321452?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=nationalist&first=1_&max_to_show=10 (accessed 24th February 2010)

[9]   Davies, *The Routledge Companion*, p.118.

[10] Joseph Goebbels, *Those Damned Nazis*
      http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/haken32.htm (accessed 20th February 2010).

[11] British National Party News Team, *Nationalism and Israel,*
      http://web.archive.org/web/20071014195726/http://www.bnp.org.uk/news_detail.php?newsId=105
      accessed 10th February 2010)

[12] The British National Party, *The Constitution of the British National Party.'*

[13] The NSDWP, *Program of the National Socialist German Workers' Party*

[14] Nick Griffin, *The BNP: Anti-asylum protest, racist sect or power-winning movement?*

far-Right seek[15]. The Nazi Party were also fundamentally set on keeping a foot in the past and challenging the future. Nolte's theory of 'anti-transcendence' is highly useful for this matter. For Nolte fascism represents a reaction against the *'spirit of modernity'*[16]. This anti-transcendence broadly is the *"reaction against the modern process of emancipation and a radical denial of the liberal society that nurtures it"*; emancipation intellectually from the limits of human thought and practically from class, nationality and living conditions[17]. This transcendence is an inherent part of movements such as industrialisation, capitalism, liberalism, and communism. As society changes fascism desperately seeks to push against this progress and to keep humans in the traditional hierarchies, territories and cultures. The Nazi Party were violently against transcendence; *"a process that was leading inevitably to a world of internationalism, pacifism and equality"*[18]. For the Nazi Party, this was not a natural occurrence but part of an international Jewish plot carried out through Communism, Capitalism and Liberalism. The Nazi's branded communism – 'Judeo-Bolshevism', as many of the revolutionaries around Europe were Jewish, from Marx, Lenin and Trotsky, to Kurt Eisner of the Bavarian Soviet Republic**.** They also considered Jews as the *"incarnation of capitalism*[19]*"*. Both Communism and Capitalism were seen as drastically changing society; removing national consciousness and social hierarchies, bringing greater democracy and emancipation for the people, and in the eyes of the Nazis making Germany weak, powerless and submissive to the Jewish race. In order to defend Germany from these changes the Nazi party saw that the Jewish plot and therefore race had to be stopped. This is what led Nolte to state that genocide of the Jewish race was always the aim of the Nazi Party from the very beginning, for it was the only 'logical' way in Hitler's eyes to stop transcendence. In the modern day this anti-transcendence takes on a different form but nevertheless is still at the core of the far-Right. If one reads any BNP statement or manifesto, repeated over and over again is the opinion that traditional British society and culture is being torn apart; "the *character of daily life is being corroded... in the name of a "modernisation"*[20]*.* Just as the Nazi Party identified this transcendence as being racially led, the BNP too sees the destruction of traditional British culture and identity as being caused by immigrants; *"their very presence in such numbers...transforms our society, changing Britain and the British peoples into something which is not British*[21]*".* So just as the Nazi Party saw defeating transcendence was only possible through the expulsion and dissimilation of the 'enemy' race, the BNP too envisages the returning to the pre-1948 ideal Britain as possible only through exclusion of those 'non-racially' British. Therefore one can see that both the Nazi Party and BNP are inherently anti-transcendental and both see other 'races' as the propagators. This may go some way to explain why the Nazi Party and the BNP seek racial-nationalism; the Nazi Party's anti-Semitism and the BNP's anti-immigrant beliefs are innately linked to their anti-transcendence. The Nazi Party could not react against modernity without attacking the Jewish race, and the BNP cannot counter changes in British society without opposing

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[15]   The British National Party, *The British National Party Manifesto 2005*
       http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/BNP_uk_manifesto.pdf (accessed 14/02/2010)
[16]   Roger Griffin, *International Fascism: Theories, Causes, and the New Consensus* (London: Arnold, 1998), p.47.
[17]   Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (New York: Harvard, 1988), p.86
[18]   Henry A. Turner, *Reappraisals of Fascism*, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), p.21.
[19]   Joseph Goebbels, *Those Damned Nazis*
[20]   The British National Party, *The British National Party Manifesto 2005*
[21]   Nick Griffin, '*The BNP: Anti-asylum protest, racist sect or power-winning movement?'*

immigration; thereby the only way in which the Nazi Party and the BNP see that anti-transcendence is achievable is by pursuing a racially dominant form of nationalism.

To conclude, one can assert that many of the aspects of the classic fascist Nazi Party are beginning to repeat themselves in the modern day through the rhetoric of the British National Party. The BNP has adopted a racial-nationalistic outlook that has many similarities with that of the Nazi Party and is in turn directing its political course. This too is true for the anti-transcendental nature of fascism that is again repeating itself. The BNP's anti-immigration beliefs are in many ways a repetition of the Nazi Party's anti-Semitism, in that both are led by anti-transcendence. However, it is important to assert that the extent that the BNP's anti-immigration sentiment manifests is more subtle compared to Nazi anti-Semitism as it lacks the pure hatred proliferated by Hitler and the explicit belief that certain races are *untermensch* (inferior races). One may assert however that if the BNP are to proceed with their beliefs, with their inherent opposition to racial assimilation and firm view that segregation is the only way in which a return to a 'British' culture and nation can be achieved, then in the future the history of 'classic' fascism will be repeated much more.

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